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A B S T R A C T   
Spatial economic change is an energy justice issue (Bouzarovski and Simcock, 2017) - an essential consideration 
in how we choose to re-wire the economy for a carbon-free future. Nothing like the conscious system-wide 
change required has been attempted before. Rapid policy decisions risk embedding existing injustices or 
creating new ones unless steps are taken to ameliorate those risks. We present a model that takes a whole-system 
view of the UK spatial economy, examining how increasing distance costs (e.g. through fuel tax hikes) have 
unequal impacts on regions and sectors. The model establishes an important carbon transition policy principle: 
change in spatial flows of internal trade, which are certain to occur rapidly during transition, have measurable 
energy justice implications. Peripheral economic regions, in rural and coastal areas and many city outskirts are 
most vulnerable, as are petrochemical, agricultural and connected sectors. Policy must go beyond identifying 
places and sectors most affected: it is the connections between them that matter most. The "push" of spatially 
aware fiscal policy needs to be combined with the "pull" of targeted interventions designed to promote low- 
carbon intermediate connections. This is not only just, but would help make (potentially costly) transition 
more politically acceptable.   
1. Introduction 
The UK economy is a network with millions of physical connections - 
goods moving between production sites, working their way from pri-
mary processing through to final production and sale, often back and 
forth across national boundaries. This system is first and foremost 
spatial. Over time, political, economic and technological forces 
constantly push it into new, often spatially unequal, formations. Win-
ners and losers can and do change geographical position as those forces 
play out. 
While these dynamics have always been central to spatial economics, 
the implications of carbon transition require a comprehensive shift in 
thinking. Taking the science of climate change seriously implies a rapid 
move away from fossil fuels. Existing infrastructure and institutions are 
embedded in a fossil fuel world - changing this will require much more 
radical action than is commonly accepted (Anderson and Bows, 2012). 
An energy revolution needs to take place (Jefferson, 2008; Kramer and 
Haigh, 2009). The necessity of this is starting to make its way into na-
tional policy (Committee on Climate Change, 2019) - but the spatial 
implications remain little understood. 
Without careful policy, this revolution may create new inequalities. 
This realisation has led to the emergence of ideas about energy justice 
(McCauley et al., 2019) and just transition (Heffron and McCauley, 
2018), building on earlier environmental justice work. Thinking about 
spatial injustice is far from new (e.g. Harvey, 1973) but the urgency of 
transition changes its nature fundamentally (Bouzarovski and Simcock, 
2017). 
The ’UK 2070’ Commission on regional inequalities has recognised 
how closely climate and spatial inequality are connected (UK 2070 
Commission, 2019, p. 22) but there is still a gap in understanding about 
the scale of the spatial challenge: nothing like the kind of conscious 
system-wide change required has been attempted before. Because of 
this, energy justice is all the more imperative. Rapid policy decisions are 
likely to risk creating new sets of spatial winners and losers, embedding 
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existing injustices or creating new ones, unless steps are taken to 
ameliorate these unintended consequences. 
Understanding the processes that potentially lead to spatially unjust 
effects is a necessary first step in learning how to address them. This 
paper proposes taking a step back from the detail to focus on a ’whole 
systems’ view of the web of trade connections that constitute a spatial 
economy. This is in line with current policy emphasis on considering 
national trade and infrastructure in “a way that more consistently con-
siders interdependencies” (HM Government, 2017). 
Specifically, we focus on the impact of distance cost change at the 
national level, as a way to analyse system-wide change. Our modelling 
approach takes the UK’s existing spatial economic layout - the location 
of firms, their turnover and money flows between sectors - and examines 
how those money flows change across a sweep of distance cost scenarios 
that bound likely present-day values. The difference between each in-
crease in distance cost is treated as an ‘if-then’ scenario, focusing on 
trade/money flow changes while keeping the spatial economic layout 
otherwise fixed. 
Modelling these broad distance cost changes is meant primarily to 
open up discussion about whole-system spatial impacts. By keeping the 
underlying distance model relatively simple, the model asks: even in 
scenarios where distance costs change evenly, do such cost changes 
create spatially uneven outcomes? The answer is yes. In terms of tran-
sition, a distance cost increase may represent any number of infra-
structure and transport policy choices, including most obviously an 
increase in fuel duty. The model helps think about where and in what 
sectors the largest effects of transition cost changes are likely to fall – and 
thus suggests avenues for thinking about non-regressive policy 
responses. 
Energy justice tends to consider final or domestic energy issues more 
often. This paper’s model shows that higher-level change in intermedi-
ate trade flows also have vital energy justice implications. Our approach 
makes it possible to identify those sectors and places where impacts are 
likely to be consistent, those more affected at particular distance cost 
steps and others that change from gaining to losing out (or vice versa) 
over the full range of model values. 
The energy justice literature is methodologically very rich. The 
model presented here provides a novel contribution to that, while also 
promoting the idea that such quantitative approaches can be a vital part 
of the energy justice toolkit. 
The model uses three key data sources. UK transport data is used to 
identify the UK’s existing pattern of internal trade distance decay - an 
essential starting point for the analysis, demonstrating the existence and 
curve of sub-national distance costs. By itself, spatially collating this 
data demonstrates distance matters for the UK’s spatial economy - the 
model examines how much it matters, and in which sectors and places it 
matters most. We also use the UK Business Structure Database, a rich 
micro-dataset on trade location and composition and a unique source for 
examining trade interdependencies. This is connected with (non-spatial) 
trade flow data. 
Section 3 describes these datasets in detail and thoroughly docu-
ments the model’s method. Section 4 presents the results. The conclu-
sion (section 5) synthesises findings from the results and discusses the 
policy implications in depth. First, we briefly explore the relevant 
theory. 
2. Theoretical context 
McCauley et al. (2019 p.919) see energy justice as a set of tools for 
doing three things: "understanding when and where ethical questions on 
energy appear, who should be involved in their resolution and ulti-
mately which solutions must be pursued to achieve a sustainable energy 
system underpinned by fairness and equity". 
This paper focuses on the first of these: it aims to identify where, and 
in what sectors, tensions may appear if pressure is put on the UK spatial 
economy as a whole. This is then used to examine the underlying energy 
justice issues. The model also suggests ways to think about the third 
point: what solutions may best meet just energy outcomes? 
Following Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017), we agree that we cannot 
fully understand energy justice and transition issues without addressing 
their inherently spatial nature. As they say, "energy transitions are 
generators of geographically uneven social, political, and environmental 
displacements which may increase the vulnerability of particular social 
groups or places" (Bouzarovski and Simcock, 2017 p.645). Such change 
has vital implications for all components of the economy: the location of 
jobs, the pull factors affecting migration and the spatial provision of 
services required by workers and their families (such as housing and 
social services) as well as resource demand and environmental impacts. 
Addressing energy justice thus requires "interventions in the funda-
mental driving forces of spatial inequality" (ibid. p.640). 
Unlike the environmental justice literature it originates from, there 
are few quantitative takes on energy justice (and some scepticism about 
certain quantitative approaches; e.g. Heffron et al., 2015). We believe a 
utility-based spatial economic modelling approach can shed light on 
energy justice issues and allow us to simulate the ramifications of 
particular policy scenarios in a way that would otherwise be difficult. 
Utility-based methods are highly effective for understanding how 
cost changes affect whole systems. They see the spatial economy as an 
optimised landscape, balanced between a set of economic and 
geographical forces (and, as Fujita notes, equally powerful social forces 
often left out of the picture; Fujita, 1999, p. 380). That optimum is never 
perfect or static: over time as economic forces, technology and policy 
shift, so do geographical winners and losers. 
Most importantly, an economically optimal landscape is not neces-
sarily socially optimal or just. Modelling change in those optima can 
support energy justice goals by suggesting places to look for negative 
impacts that policy can then address. 
Such an approach allows a ’whole systems’ focus - something energy 
justice theorists embrace (Bouzarovski and Simcock, 2017 p.641; 
McCauley et al., 2013). It is an old idea (Isard discusses the need to 
consider the ’gestalt whole’ of the spatial economy; Isard, 1956, p. 56) 
made newly relevant by the urgency of transition. 
Concentrating on generic ’distance costs’ is a useful tool for whole- 
systems thinking. It is not a replacement for more specific analyses, 
but it allows a broader overview that would otherwise be difficult. 
Distance costs become a much more urgent factor to understand because 
transitioning to a low carbon economy - if done successfully - is a radical 
break in spatial economic history. This is why energy justice and spatial 
economics are such a timely fit. Up to now, spatial economics has existed 
in a world of gradualism (Pearson and Foxon, 2012) where, for example, 
oil infrastructure took “as long as a century to work through” (Hall, 
1993), ever-declining costs, and a partially blind mix of planning and 
organic growth - what Fujita et al. (2001, p. 253) call the ’history of the 
world part one’. For some, the logical conclusion of this is to dismiss the 
need to factor in distance costs at all, since in modern times they are such 
a small percentage of overall costs (e.g. Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004). 
The issue is not simply that costs may rise - it is the nature of the 
required change. A close historical comparison might be containerisa-
tion (Stahlbock and Voss, 2008; Hummels, 2001; Taggart, 1999): in this 
case, a single technology that rapidly lowered costs re-oriented the 
pressure on nations and cities, changing which grew and shrank. Tran-
sition implies an even more rapid shift, covering all sectors of the 
economy - the spatial economic trajectory will be difficult to predict, 
with path dependencies quickly becoming locked in (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2015). Accounting for the energy justice im-
plications of this will need ongoing vigilance. 
Much recent transition literature finds lessons in ‘shocks’ like the 
seventies oil crisis (National Economic Development Office, 1974; Segal, 
2011) or economic cliff edges such as Cuba’s adaptation to a sudden halt 
to oil supply (see e.g. Wright, 2008). These have become examples for 
intense study and even, in the case of the transition movement, imitation 
(see e.g. Glasmeier, 2007; North, 2010). But these often have narrow 
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views of distance costs, both in their focus on raw fuel and view of 
economic connections. 
Our concept of distance costs is used to stand in for the full range of 
factors that may cause trade friction over space. This is similar to ‘trade 
costs’: “the sum of all costs incurred to deliver a good to its user” 
(Duranton and Storper, 2005, 2008). Transport costs are only one 
element of this (Disdier and Head, 2008). In the international trade 
literature (where the idea of trade costs originates) the full range of these 
elements can include “policy barriers, information costs, contract 
enforcement costs, … legal and regulatory costs, and local distribution 
costs” (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003 p.691). In addition, raw trans-
portation costs are themselves composed of other elements. In one U.S. 
analysis, freight costs are found to be approximately a third fuel, a third 
driver costs (Fender and Pierce, 2012) - the UK is very similar, despite 
quite different fuel costs (Freight Transport Association, 2015). Trade 
costs are deduced from the ‘revealed preference’ of spatial decay of 
goods over distance. In our model, UK transport data serves this purpose 
(section 3.1). 
We prefer the term ’distance costs’ as many of the international el-
ements are weaker at the sub-national level - but the key idea that these 
costs are composed of many forces is essential for thinking about the 
model, and any possible policy response. 
Excluding distance has implications for policy goals such as 
achieving socially just carbon taxes. Fuel taxes in particular clearly have 
huge importance - Sterner argues persuasively for their role in carbon 
policy (Sterner, 2012) and shows how OECD countries could have 44% 
lower transport carbon emissions if they had long-term fuel tax similar 
that of the UK. Conversely, they could have been 30% higher if Amer-
ican fuel tax levels had been in place (Sterner, 2007). But calculations 
for creating either revenue-neutral or non-regressive (Leahy et al., 2009) 
carbon taxes are on the whole aspatial; if changing fuel costs impacts on 
distance costs, any tax change will alter spatial economic output in un-
predictable ways. Blanket carbon tax increases that raise distance costs 
may affect peripheral regions more severely than central ones. Identi-
fying how those impacts might fall spatially requires understanding how 
spatial economies may change form as costs change - this paper is a 
contribution to that aim. 
This section ends with a quick note on ways in which the Business 
Structure Database has been used by others to analyse the UK’s spatial 
economy. Duranton and Overman’s analysis of UK industrial clustering 
is especially relevant, identifying the UK’s pattern of uneven spatial 
forces. They found at smaller sub-regional scales, same-industry clus-
tering dominates, with most of this below a 50km range (Duranton and 
Overman, 2005), while between regions (above 150km) they find strong 
evidence for vertically-linked trade flows between connected sectors 
(Duranton and Overman, 2008). Other analyses find evidence for 
functional clustering - HQs and research/development operations clus-
tering more; less human-capital intensive production being more 
dispersed (Bade et al., 2015). 
The BSD has also been used to measure business growth and its affect 
on employment and innovation over time (Anyadike-Danes et al., 2009; 
Mason et al., 2009), to examine agglomeration (Simpson, 2007) and a 
detailed breakdown of the industrial structure of the UK (Bonner et al., 
2013). 
These analyses contribute to a picture of a dense, optimised UK 
spatial economy. Our model asks how this optimum may come under 
stress as costs change rapidly. The conclusion discusses dynamic out-
comes in light of the results. 
3. Model method and data 
3.1. Data 
The analysis builds on three data sources from the same year, linked 
to create an estimate of the spatial pattern of trade flows within the UK. 
The most important of these is the Business Structure Database (BSD) 
(UK Data Service, 2010). This provides an unparalleled description of 
the spatial structure of the UK economy: the vast majority of individual 
businesses and productive units are detailed, covering around 99% of 
total turnover (Office For National Statistics, 2006). It gives information 
on their exact location, turnover, employee number and 2007 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) sectoral code at the five digit level. The 
BSD is managed by the Secure Data Service and must be accessed under 
secure conditions. 
The flow of trade between sectors in the UK is described in ‘supply- 
and-use’ input-output (IO) matrices. These matrices give the full 
network of money flows between sectors (given as 3-digit SIC codes) 
providing a window onto the morphology of internal trade. Specifically, 
this paper uses the ‘domestic use’ input-output matrix, as this gives 
purely internal trade flows within the UK, excluding imports (Office For 
National Statistics, 2010). This describes over 7000 flows between sec-
tors for the year we examine. 
In this paper, the BSD is linked to the domestic use matrix by SIC 
code, using the spatial information in the BSD to estimate where trade 
flows between sectors in the matrix originate and where it moves to 
when spent. As the most recent domestic use matrix data at the time of 
the project was from 2010, data from the BSD for the same year is used. 
The third data source is Department for Transport (DfT) data for 
‘goods lifted’ within the UK in 2010 (Department for Transport, 2010). 
Here, we extract regional flows from this data to produce an estimate of 
the spatial decay of trade over distance. This estimate is then used to 
calibrate the link between the BSD and the trade flow matrix to create a 
range of ‘if-then’ scenarios for how trade flows spatially within the UK. 
This dataset demonstrates an essential fact: trade decays over distance 
quite rapidly for domestic intermediate goods, much more-so than 
would be expected if trades were between random locations on the is-
land of Great Britain (see supplementary material point 4). 
3.2. Overview of the method 
The analysis starts by estimating where geographically in the UK each 
sector’s consumption originates. We label the supply-use IO matrix as M. 
Each element of M describes a money flow mod between an origin sector 
(o) and destination sector (d) - for example, money originating from 
‘fabricated metal products’ going to ‘basic iron and steel’. M is non- 
spatial: each mod value is for money flows between different sectors in 
the UK as a whole. 
To create a spatial estimate for where each flow originates, each mod 
is split across the UK’s 243 ‘travel to work area’ (TTWA) zones (Coombes 
and Bond, 2007). We index these spatial locations using z  1, 2, … 243. 
Every mod value is split using a proxy for demand: turnover from the 
BSD. The BSD’s 700-plus SIC codes are binned into the cruder three-digit 
categories used in the domestic use data so the two data sources match. 
voz is turnover summed per origin sector and zone. Let bmoz be the 
geographical proxy. bmoz is just a fraction: each origin sector’s local 
turnover in zone z divided by that sector’s national turnover, giving 
individual proxy values that sum to one for each origin sector across all 
zones: 
bmoz
voz
P243
z1voz
; where 0  bmodz  1 (1) 
Each proxy fraction bmoz is then used to split each IO matrix cell mod 
geographically, giving each origin ’budget’ yodz that e.g. construction in 
London spends on fabricated metal across the entire UK: 
yodzmod*bmoz (2) 
This creates over four hundred thousand separate chunks of con-
sumption, one for each matrix cell split across each TTWA. (Not all 
TTWAs contain all sectors - on average, they contain 41 out of a possible 
58.) 
Each budget yodz is then ‘spent’ using a constrained Constant 
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Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function (see section 3.3), allocating 
them from their origin zone assignments to TTWAs containing the 
destination sectors, creating a spatial estimate for all IO matrix flows. 
This process is repeated across a ‘parameter-sweep’ of distance cost 
steps that bracket likely real-world values (see section 3.4). yodz does not 
change on each step as this is based on the fixed turnover proxy - it is 
differences in patterns of destination spending between distance costs 
steps that the analysis uses. The results ask: how does spatial spending 
change between steps across sectors and places? 
There are two other important considerations. Firstly: before turn-
over from the BSD is assigned to sectors/zones to make the origin proxy, 
it is split between a firm’s local units (related branches, production sites 
and other business premises) in proportion to each unit’s employee 
count. The vast majority of records in the BSD are single-unit - these 
make up about 97% of all enterprises by number but only 40% of total 
turnover. The remaining 3% of firms with more than one unit thus ac-
count for 60% of turnover. Multi-unit firms are usually spread over more 
than one TTWA and units’ SIC codes can vary. Splitting turnover thus 
assigns it correctly to sector and location. 
Secondly, trade flows for physical goods sectors only are examined. 
These are the first 58 SIC categories. Turnover in physical goods sectors 
from the BSD much more closely match sector flows in the domestic use 
matrix, making for a better initial use of the method. (The turnover 
proxy correlates well to consumption in the domestic use matrix when 
focusing on physical goods only: an r2 of 0.94.) The conclusion discusses 
extending the method into services. 
3.3. Distance decay model 
The distance decay model takes each estimate of sectoral/ 
geographical consumption yodz and ‘spends’ it across the UK to produce a 
demand map. To do this, each origin sector/zone (where e.g. ‘fabricated 
metal products’ in London is one sector/zone) is treated as a separate 
economic ‘representative agent’ with a budget yodz, where d is the sector 
they buy from across the whole UK. A constrained function, keeping 
values to those in the IO matrix, is used to allot that agent’s budget 
across the UK. A ‘Constant Elasticity of Substitution’ (CES) function is 
used for this purpose. The CES approach has been used successfully at a 
more aggregate level to produce analyses of international trade costs 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, 2004). 
The intuition for the CES function is this: a range of production sites 
within a particular geographical zone can buy a mix of inputs from 
across the UK. First, this mix will have a certain spatial decay pattern. 
Collectively, firms will likely buy less from more distant sites if a closer 
opportunity exists. Buying patterns for a group of firms will tend to look 
more like a smooth spatial decay, compared to a single firm. Second, this 
pattern will be affected by input substitutability. Firms buying a highly 
substitutable input like cement will be more likely to buy from the 
closest source. For more specialised or valuable inputs, geography will 
matter less. The CES function captures this dynamic by letting a single 
representative agent buy from across the UK. 
The method uses its own form of CES function that turns a repre-
sentation of individual trades into an aggregate picture of spatial 
spending. Each individual trade between sectors is represented by a 
simple cost equation: 
podz α βndw (3)  
podz is the total price an origin sector o in zone z faces for a unit of good 
from destination sector d. α is the base cost of the good, β is the per-unit 
distance cost (these do not vary; see below). ndw is the distance from the 
origin sector/zone in z to the location of each zone containing a desti-
nation sector d. The location of these destination sector/zones is indexed 
with w  1, 2, … 243. By representing each individual trade, it would be 
straightforward to use more involved distance functions such as econ-
omies of scale or zoning. The paper sticks to this simple equation, 
however - it allows a consistent fit with the spatial decay data (see next 
section) and is also the most transparent way to test the effect of distance 
cost change in the method. 
Each individual purchase is entered into a CES function defined in 
the following way: 
gdw bmdw*Podw
P1=ρ  1odw *yodz
Pn
v1 bmdv*P
ρ=ρ  1
odv 
(4)  
yodz is the budget described in section 3.2 being spent in zone z by origin 
sector o (in z) on destination sector d (across all zones the UK). w is the 
specific destination zone being calculated for. v  1,2, … 243 is the set of 
all zones containing the destination sector d. gdw is the individual money 
amount going to sector d in zone w. Each destination sector/zone 
amount gdw is calculated individually in turn, creating a set of con-
strained spends for each yodz. podw is equation(3): the cost of buying from 
a specific destination sector/zone; podv is the cost for every other desti-
nation sector/zone for this budget. 
Every individual spend g is then summed per destination sector d and 
TTWA w to give a final assigned demand map. The results then use the 
difference between these demand maps at each increase in distance cost 
β (see below) to estimate how spending demand changes as distance 
costs change. 
A key element of the function is bmdw/dv – these are the relative size of 
each sector receiving money. It acts to multiply each individual trade to 
their sector scale. The turnover proxy is used again for this purpose, 
allowing the relative size of individual sector/zones to be entered into 
the CES function. 
ρ is the elasticity of substitution parameter. At high values (ρ → 1), a 
sector is buying more generic inputs, preferring the cheapest available 
suppliers. If ρ is low, a sector buys a more diverse mix from a larger 
geographical spread. At the firm level, this implies the need for more 
specific forms of input. 
3.4. Determining model values 
A set of model parameter values are selected that bound the spatial 
decay of UK industrial trade, matching against the Department for 
Transport data. The whole range is then parameter-swept (see e.g. 
Wibisono et al., 2008). β is increased in steps, representing a series of 
increasing distance costs. The bound of this range is within the solid 
lines in Fig. 1. 
There are three parameters that must be set in the model. First, the 
elasticity of substitution parameter ρ, which shapes the mix of goods 
bought, and thus the distance they will be bought from, is used in the 
CES function itself. Second, value density (Lovell et al., 2005) is used. In 
terms of the model, this can be defined as the ratio of base good cost α 
over per-unit distance cost β. The important spatial idea embodied in 
value density is that neither raw value or distance cost alone determines 
the distance at which goods can viably trade - the ratio determines it. For 
α/β, this holds true. Thus, when setting parameters, this means there is 
only actually one number to target rather than two. Finally, a target total 
transport cost can be used to choose a single pair of values for ρ and 
value density - this is explained below. 
Fig. 1 summarises these key elements used for calibration, comparing 
actual transport data with the model’s distance decay. It contains the 
following elements. The three solid lines show how the underlying dis-
tance decay model works. These show three different values for distance 
cost, with the centre value being a ‘most likely’ estimate matching data, 
and the two outer lines setting bounds for the model’s parameter sweep. 
The upper line labelled ‘low distance cost’ shows spending spread over a 
much larger distance than the lower-labelled ‘high distance cost’ line. 
Using the method described in section 3.3, Fig. 1 illustrates the dis-
tance decay model by simulating a single ‘representative agent’ at dis-
tance zero (representing a group of firms in a particular sector/zone) 
buying from an evenly spaced range of sectors (three hundred in the case 
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of Fig. 1) up to a distance of 1150km, the maximum buying distance 
between TTWAs in the UK. The agent buys a mix of goods over distance, 
with the spatial decay of the mix determined by ρ and value density. 
Model output and data are all normalised so that buying at distance zero 
equals one. A key feature of the CES approach is that the normalised 
shape of the spatial decay curve remains unaltered by the number and 
position of sellers (though actual optimal quantities change, shifting the 
shape up and down). 
The dashed lines in Fig. 1 show actual distance decay values deduced 
from DfT data, consisting of a series of data tables describing road freight 
activity for Great Britain. Two slightly different sources are used: drop- 
off of trade between the old Government Office Regions (GOR) and data 
for distance of ‘goods lifted’ (actual weight of goods carried over dis-
tance) for a range of commodities. Adjusted for ‘route factor’ difference 
using Google route data, both sources match (see e.g. Black, 2003; 
Chapman, 1979 and supplementary material point 3 for method). The 
central solid line in Fig. 1 is a best-fit LOESS estimate of this data. 
3.5. Total transport costs 
There are a range of combinations for ρ and value density that pro-
duce the same decay of spending over distance. In order to settle on a 
single pair of values for them, the final constraint used is transport cost 
as a proportion of total spending. Fig. 1 includes these percent transport 
costs for each of the test model’s lines, ranging between 3.5% and 
3.68%. These target values were chosen by extracting an estimate of 
average transport costs from the 2010 domestic use data and comparing 
intermediate transport sector consumption against total spending. 
(These average values are analysed in more depth in supplementary 
material point 6.). 
Transport costs derived from the IO data concur with existing survey- 
based estimates of transport costs. Diamond and Spence (1989) found 
transport costs to be between 3% and 6% of ‘total operating costs’. For 
the U.S., Glaeser and Kohlhase (Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004) find them 
to be between 1.2% and 10%, though domestic transport costs are likely 
to be different for larger land-masses. Here, a single average transport 
cost value from the domestic use IO data is used - this is 3.66%. In the 
model, this shifts between 3.5% and 3.68% as total transport costs vary 
with distance costs, but not monotonically: optimal buying choices are 
more localised when per-unit transport costs rise, so this reduces relative 
transport costs (this is the key spatial economic effect of varying value 
densities).The test model data’s ‘most likely’ spatial decay curve is 
matched to the mean value of 3.66%, resulting in a high elasticity of 
substitution (ρ  0.965). A high value density range is used to buffer this 
‘most likely’ value: with base good cost α set to 30,000, β ranges from 7 
to 41. 
4. Results 
4.1. Overview 
The results of the model are presented in two ways. Section 4.2 be-
gins by looking at the overall geography of the model output. It then digs 
deeper into that geography, looking at how specific places are affected, 
and what sectors in those places are particularly vulnerable. Section 4.3 
looks more closely at sectoral impacts, ending with a detailed 
geographical look at four sectors the prior analysis identifies as most 
affected. 
Where the first section focuses on the impact of distance cost in-
creases, the second considers which sectors are ‘most affected’ by look-
ing at the overall geographical volatility of demand. The last section also 
shifts the focus from average impacts at all distance cost steps, looking 
Fig. 1. Summary visualisation of model calibration. Low and high distance cost lines bound all distance cost values used in the model. The central line is a ‘most 
likely’ fit to spatial decay of trade from Department of Transport data. Solid lines are model values, the central dashed lines are LOESS curve fits to DfT data. 
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more closely at how low versus high distance cost changes affect some 
sectors and places consistently, others variably. 
4.2. Geographical effects: overall impact 
The maps in Fig. 2 give a spatial overview of the model’s results. The 
amount of demand each TTWA gains or loses on each distance cost in-
crease is averaged for the whole parameter sweep. The two maps 
compare the absolute amount of money change versus percent change 
(between each distance cost increase) in each TTWA. While of the same 
polarity in each TTWA, the two show quite different geographies. The 
map of absolute change is best for a ‘top down’ view of how money flows 
change for the UK as a whole. London and Aberdeen stand out starkly 
from all others. London is by far the largest net gainer at all levels of 
distance cost increase: four times larger gains than the next two largest 
gainers, Belfast and Glasgow. Aberdeen has the largest absolute losses - 
the causes of these are discussed below. 
Percentage change emphasises instead the point of view of each 
TTWA: while a small economy, Machynlleth in Wales has a near 5% 
average drop, Aberdeen - despite being the largest loser in absolute 
terms - has only an average 0.6% fall. Percentage-wise, Machynlleth is 
the second most negatively affected; Aberdeen is 132 on that list. 
Equally, Shetland Islands’ 10% gain puts it first in the percentage rank, 
where London gains only 1%, placing it at 52. 
There are thus quite different clusters affected in absolute and 
percent terms. Large absolute gains are geographically disparate, while 
the losses are focused in the Midlands. There are percentage gain clus-
ters, however, concentrated in the South-West, Northern Ireland, and 
North and central Scotland, while the percent losses cluster in North 
Wales, the North-West coast and other coastal spots. 
4.3. The industrial structure of the least/most affected TTWAs 
Do those TTWAs that experience the highest and lowest change in 
demand as distance costs increase share anything in common, in terms 
of their industrial structure? To answer this, the UK is divided into four 
equal-sized groups of TTWAs and the groups are then ranked from 
‘largest demand gains’ to ‘largest demand losses’. This section looks at 
the top and bottom of these four groups. 
In order to give both TTWA and sector change an equality across all 
values, the average of each TTWA’s sector percent change in demand is 
used to create the rank. This means, for example, that a TTWA with forty 
sectors, each gaining 10% more demand over a distance cost increase, 
will have the same average as a TTWA with ten sectors, if they also each 
gain 10%. TTWAs like Aberdeen that have been identified as losing large 
absolute amounts can now appear as overall gainers. In Aberdeen’s case, 
this is because its crude losses are only 4% per beta step on average; 
many of its other sectors make big gains in percentage terms. 
Fig. 3 shows the economic structure of the top and bottom groups 
(solid bars), mirrored against each other for easy comparison. Percent 
sector size for the entire UK economy is overlaid on both as hollow bars, 
to show how they differ from the national picture. Both are ordered by 
size of sector at the national level; the top thirty of these are given. 
There is a clear contrast in industrial structure. Largest-gaining 
TTWAs are dominated by construction, crude/petrol, petrochemicals 
and mining support (the solid bars are larger than the hollow bars 
marking those sectors as a percent of the whole UK economy). In the 
‘largest losses’ group, each of these is much smaller than the national 
Fig. 2. TTWA average change in demand over whole parameter sweep, absolute (a) and percent (b).  
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picture - in the case of crude/petrol and mining support, they are almost 
non-existent. The largest-losses group also has a clear agricultural 
structure: agriculture itself makes up a far larger proportion of its 
turnover than nationally, and a number of sectors in the agriculture 
processing chain are over-represented. 
4.4. Sector effects 1: which sectors are most affected by distance cost 
increase? 
This section identifies the sectors most and least affected by distance 
cost change across the parameter sweep by examining the geographical 
volatility of demand. Because total demand per sector does not change (it 
is fixed to the original input-output matrix row sums) raw demand 
cannot be used to measure sector impact. However, the difference in 
where the method assigns this demand between distance cost steps can 
be used. The absolute maximum change for a given distance cost in-
crease would arise if all demand moved from one subset of TTWAs to 
another entirely separate subset - a hundred percent change (this is al-
ways symmetrical, negative and positive change summing to zero). 
Thus, smaller changes can be made proportional to this hundred percent 
maximum for each sector. This makes change comparable across 
otherwise disparate sector sizes: the higher the percentage, the more 
geographically volatile that sector’s response is. (In absolute terms, 
sectors that see the largest movement of money are, unsurprisingly, 
those with the largest total demand. This correlation is almost perfect; a 
Spearman correlation of total sector demand versus average per-sector 
demand change over the sweep is 0.98). 
To make sector response also comparable across distance cost values, 
each can be ranked for every parameter step, where first-ranking is 
highest-percentage (‘most affected’) and last is smallest. Sectors with a 
low standard deviation (SD) of their ranking over the whole parameter 
sweep have the most stable response to distance cost increases. High SD 
sectors change their rank position - the impact of distance cost change is 
more variable. 
Fig. 4 picks out fifteen of the least and most affected sectors, judged 
by their average position in the rankings over the whole parameter 
sweep, and where rank 1 is ‘most affected’. Their standard deviation is 
shown by circle size, indicating which change ranking position more 
than others over the full range of distance cost change. 
Coastal sectors are most affected, both highest in the rankings and 
with small standard deviations, so they stay close to most-affected 
overall. Crude oil and petrochemicals also both tend to locate in 
coastal regions - and most of the other high-ranking sectors rely on 
petro-chemical input. Inorganics, for example, includes manufacture of 
fertiliser and nitrogen, which requires natural gas input; a number of 
other high-ranking sectors are agro-chemical and feed related. Petro-
chemical production processes tend to be highly geographically clus-
tered; this result seems to suggest these will come under particular 
pressure. (The geography of two of these sectors is examined below.) A 
number of primary-production and low value-density sectors appear to 
be the most affected also: cement/lime/plaster, coal/lignite and iron/ 
steel. 
4.5. Sector effects 2: geographies for four key sectors 
These final results focus on how demand in four key sectors changes 
geographically over the full sweep of distance costs. Two are 
petrochemical-related: crude/gas/ore and inorganics. Another two - 
construction and fabricated metals - see the largest absolute shifts in 
money amounts between TTWAs. (The figures in this section are best 
viewed in colour.) 
Fig. 5a illustrates the approach used by showing how demand for 
crude/gas/ore changes in all TTWAs receiving demand. Gains and losses 
are symmetrical each side of zero, as per the previous section, balancing 
the input-output table row sums on each step. The most prominent 
TTWAs are picked out in the legend. London, in light blue, begins with 
the largest gain, but ends with the largest loss - it can be seen in top left 
and also bottom right. Aberdeen’s losses completely dominate for the 
lower half of the parameter sweep but then become insignificant in the 
higher-cost half. Middlesborough gains well past the ‘most likely’ β 
Fig. 3. Economic sector size (as percent of each sub-group’s whole economy, measured by turnover) for the ‘largest losses’ and ‘largest gains’ TTWA groups. Hollow 
bars are percent sector size for the UK economy as a whole. Top thirty sectors (of whole economy) shown. (Note: in this figure, ‘crude/oil/gas’ and ‘petrol/coke’ have 
been combined into ‘crude/petrol’, in order to meet with secure data disclosure requirements.) 
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change value of 15. Chester, Hull and Reading are the only TTWAs to 
gain for every step. 
Fig. 5b and c plot only the top five gaining (top half of legend) and 
losing (bottom half of legend) TTWAs for each sector - so they are not 
symmetrical. For construction and fabricated metals, London dominates 
the story, taking the majority of gained demand, though in construction 
it turns to losses at very high distance costs. For these three sectors, it is 
the larger cities that tend to gain with the regional centres losing - 
Sheffield in particular sees a large loss in demand for fabricated metals 
as distance costs increase. 
Inorganics - along with other coastal sectors - does not have the 
largest absolute losses but sees big movements of demand relative to its 
size. A comparison of Falkirk and Glasgow inorganics shows how a 
place’s response can be very different as distance costs increase. At 
lower values, Falkirk’s gains are small - it appears to benefit consistently 
only in the higher value range. Glasgow, conversely, sees its gains peak 
and then drop away, turning to losses right at the top of the range. In-
organics has a strong tendency to cluster near coastal petrochemical 
production, especially around Wirral/Ellesmere. Its existing clusters 
tend to lose out as distance costs increase. It sees its biggest positive shift 
to Falkirk, another petrochemical centre. Wirral/Ellesmere suffers 
consistent losses, along with nearby Chester. The pattern for inorganics 
is markedly consistent: losers lose and gainers gain right across the 
sweep. 
Fig. 4. ‘Most affected’ sector rank, average rank for whole run, top and bottom fifteen. Circle size indicates standard deviation of rank position across the whole 
parameter sweep. 
Fig. 5. Four top ‘most affected’ sectors by total demand change. Change for top 5 gaining/losing TTWAs across the parameter sweep.  
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5. Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper has analysed how changes in distance costs impact on 
money flows between UK economic sectors and places. The model is a 
series of if/then scenarios grounded in the data, bounded by plausible 
distance cost values. It links the spatial pattern of industries to an input/ 
output table of flows between these industries, offering a way to theorise 
about the spatial forces connecting them - and then to examine how 
spatial economic change may impact places and sectors unequally. 
Next, we provide a synthesis of the results before analysing their 
policy and energy justice implications. 
For some sectors and places, change is consistent across all distance 
cost values. For others, increases for the lower values show quite 
different and sometimes opposite results, meaning the outcome is more 
dependent on whether the low or high distance cost scenarios more 
closely match reality. In the four key sector results (section 4.5) for 
example, London loses demand in the ‘higher’ scenarios for some key 
sectors like construction, in contrast to its usual pattern of gains. Other 
sectors like fabricated metals and inorganics generally show consistent 
responses, though inorganics also shows - for Falkirk and Glasgow - how 
positive demand changes could be very different depending on which 
scenario applies. 
Many major cities see demand increase on average as distance costs 
increase - for instance, Birmingham, Manchester, Bristol, Glasgow and 
especially London (Sheffield and Leeds buck this trend with slight 
drops). This is mirrored by drops in demand from TTWAs neighbouring 
these cities. A swathe of the South loses demand to London and a few 
other key centres. 
Though not large economies in absolute terms, agricultural areas 
generally lose demand, with knock-on effects for food production chains 
showing up in the largest loss/gain analysis and the sectoral volatility 
ranking. Indeed, the most striking loss of demand, percent-wise, is in 
agricultural parts of Wales. This is matched only by a few select coastal 
zones. 
There is an overlap of coastal impacts with (largely coastal) petro-
chemical sectors and their vertical linkages. Each set of results shows 
this in different ways, with the volatility ranking particularly suggesting 
that coastal petrochemical supply chains are vulnerable. A low-carbon 
spatial economy would obviously have particularly stark implications 
for the petrochemical sector but these results highlight how these could 
cascade to its very strong spatial and sectoral linkages, further weak-
ening coastal peripheries. (This is without considering the macro- 
economic implications; cf. National Economic Development Office, 
1974.) 
These results support an important transition policy principle: 
change in the spatial flows of internal trade, which are certain to occur 
rapidly during transition, have measurable energy justice implications. 
In the UK, already vulnerable parts of the economy appear most at risk. 
The most essential policy and energy justice implications are clear: 
the spatial impact of fuel duty or other carbon taxes are more important 
than usually understood. If unaccounted for, regressive impacts may 
result. Sterner’s work (discussed in section 2) clearly shows how 
important fuel taxes can be for carbon output, but it is equally clear from 
the model that blanket cost increases will hit already peripheral areas 
more heavily - rural, agricultural and coastal regions and, less-so, city 
outskirts. 
Increasing distance costs is spatially contracting: trade pulls in. Re-
gions may benefit if they are economically strong already, or if the 
contracting trade happens to fall more heavily where they are. Note that 
the same applies when distance costs drop: the existing spatial 
morphology will be equally put under pressure. 
So, simply targeting those places that are made worse off presents 
difficulties: it is the connections between places and sectors that matter. A 
policy like targeted fuel duty could address this by allowing the hardest- 
hit cheaper access to necessary inputs (differential fuel duty is an 
established idea - in the UK, red diesel is taxed at a much lower rate) but 
this will not solve the underlying economic damage. Regional targeting 
will work better if the focus is on developing economic/trade connec-
tions, especially to related regions and sectors that may be struggling as 
transition bites. As the first UK2070 report makes clear, "levels of con-
nectivity are still dominated by the inherited London-centric networks" 
(UK 2070 Commission, 2019, p. 70). It suggests a need to rebalance. This 
could be achieved through targeted low-carbon intermediate connec-
tions that increase connectivity for more vulnerable regions (which as 
low carbon, are less exposed to rising fuel duty), either with subsidies or 
support for specific technology deployment. If fiscal policy is the "push", 
this is the "pull". The UK Climate Commission has also suggested using 
sectoral compensation, emission trading allowances, differential tariffs 
(a form of fiscal policy) and targeted standards (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2019, p. 29). Consideration should be given to how all these 
available tools may aid or hinder deeper connectivity, not focusing 
purely on place or sector based benefits. 
All of the policy design implications so far are based on the existing 
short-run model structure. In the longer-term, dynamic responses 
become important. Longer-term demand losses are more easily inter-
preted than gains: ceteris paribus loss of capital would lead to contraction 
and firm closure. Demand increases are more complex: they could lead to 
growth or indicate that a local market simply cannot meet that demand 
and so the area or sector will suffer. Understanding what these tensions 
would mean for the dynamic pattern of spatial ‘re-wiring’ as firms adapt 
(or close) will require a combination of existing spatial economic ideas 
and an agile analysis of how increases in renewables penetration will 
alter the economic landscape. Carbon tax costs will partly drive firm 
location choices (Exbrayat et al., 2015). Climate change itself, of course, 
impacts on spatial economic outcomes (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 
2015). Existing cluster patterns built on substitutability (Berthelon 
and Freund, 2008; Disdier and Head, 2008), complementary or 
competitive regional relationships (Overman et al., 2010), labour mar-
kets and other forces will interact with transition. A particularly 
important factor is Krugman’s core-periphery dynamic (Krugman, 
1991): increasing costs could actually benefit peripheral areas, if they 
are less connected to an overly dominant core like London, while being 
better connected with other, similar regions - a goal that would be 
supported by the "pull" policies mentioned above. 
All of these dynamics will be radically affected by renewables 
penetration policy choices. Three factors in particular will be key: zero- 
carbon transport, the location of renewable energy infrastructure pro-
duction and how both of those alter the landscape for the petrochemical 
sector and its strongly spatial linkages. If transition succeeds, nascent 
renewable infrastructure clusters (such as Hull’s ’Green Port’) will usurp 
petrochemical production. The level of economic disruption this causes 
will depend partly on policy - petrochemical-intense places could be 
supported to transition - but also on fundamental differences in supply 
chain structure and labour supply. 
The granularity of detail implied by how renewables penetration 
interacts with all the spatial forces described above is beyond the reach 
of our model. Future work could include it more explicitly, to aid 
thinking on policy design for specific zero-carbon interventions. For 
example, a more granular version of the model could assess spatial and 
energy justice effects of zero-carbon transport technologies tailored to 
specific intermediate industry linkages. 
It is unrealistic to expect all implications of every technology to be 
understood before the fact, but that does not preclude taking a ’walk 
asking’ approach (Jeffries, 2010), monitoring how they impact the 
spatial layout of the UK over time. 
The moral of the model is that energy justice is inherently spatial - 
and will only become more-so as transition ramps up. The power of the 
energy justice framework is in understanding that a mixed toolbox is 
required to make transition just. We hope for a fruitful working rela-
tionship between quantitative approaches such as ours and more qual-
itative methods that can identify ways to work with stakeholders. 
There are a number of other avenues for improvement in the model 
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itself - perhaps starting with disaggregated parameter values. Transport 
costs (and thus value density) could be made sector-specific, as could 
elasticity of substitution. As mentioned above, low value-density goods 
are usually also more substitutable. The interaction of these two could 
be explored: the link between substitutability and distance naturally 
arises from the CES function’s ρ parameter. The use of turnover as a 
proxy for demand would benefit from testing alternatives; this is perhaps 
more true for demand destinations, where gross value added (GVA) or 
employment levels could also be used to fine-tune sector estimates. 
Extending the method to include service sectors would likely require a 
way to integrate labour: the defining characteristic of those sectors is 
that they are people-intensive. People’s distance cost has a direct impact 
on overall productivity (Rice et al., 2006). The supplementary material 
(point 8) analyses this issue in more depth. 
There are also potentially important extensions by incorporating 
myopia, asymmetric information and bounded rationality behaviours 
into the model which can profoundly affect market responses to envi-
ronmental risks and policies (e.g. Pryce et al., 2011). Finally, some ac-
counting for cross-border flows, if only in a very aggregate sense, could 
be useful. Relative internal/external trade quantities may offer a way to 
do this. 
Creating a just transition requires working to understand the spatial 
implications of technological, economic and policy change, identifying 
places and sectors that may lose out, and striving for policy that can help 
make (potentially costly) transition more politically acceptable (people 
value fairness as well as affordability; Demski et al., 2017). 
A continued dialogue between the UK’s rich data and our under-
standing of the underlying theory is essential to this (Duranton and 
Overman, 2008). As the UK works to develop a spatial economy fit for 
the twenty-first century, transition forces us to re-think our spatial 
economic toolbox. 
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